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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
D. PAUL FERGUSON, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ~ 
vs. 
JEFFREY PAUL JONGSMA, J. JAC-
OB JONGSMA, VAUGHN WILLIAM 
KAY and ALBERT KAY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8897 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This suit was instituted to recover damages for injur-
ies sustained by the plaintiff while engaged in an attempt 
to apprehend two of the defendants, who were caught by 
the plaintiff stealing gasoline. The case was tried before 
a jury which returned a verdict of "no cause of action." 
Judgment was entered on the verdict and the court subse-
quently denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. This 
appeal is taken from the judgment and from the order 
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denying the motion for new trial. Appellant's principal 
assignments of error relate to the instructions given and 
those refused by the court. It is plaintiff's contention that 
the court's instructions failed to present the plaintiff's 
theory of the case to the jury ; shifted the burden of proof 
on the affirmative defenses; incorrectly instructed on the 
law of the case, and, under the circumstances, were tanta-
mount to a directed verdict against the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence. It is admitted, 
however, that on the night in question, plaintiff was injured 
while trying to apprehend two juveniles, one 16 and one 
18, who were caught "red handed" stealing gas from a truck 
on East 48th South Street. It is also admitted that one of 
the defendants while trying to escape drove the "escape 
car" out of control West on 48th South to a point where 
it struck a 16 inch power pole, shearing it off and knocking 
the live wires down onto ·the ground. While this car was 
accelerating down the street, plaintiff was hanging onto 
the side, trying to get the driver to stop. When the car hit 
the pole, plaintiff was knocked off, sustaining injury. 
The dispute in the evidence relates to the motives and 
reasons for running out of control down 48th South Street. 
The defendant J ongsma generally claims he was so fright-
ened he didn't know what he was doing. The plaintiff, on 
the other hand claims that the defendant tried to get away 
and to frighten the plaintiff and in the process, intentionally 
drove his automobile directly at the plaintiff. A more de-
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tailed inspection of the evidence reveals the nature of the 
dispute. 
The Appellant, Mr. D. Paul Ferguson, lives on East 
48th South Street, a short distance east of the little town 
of Holladay. He has lived in this neighborhood for several 
years. Prior to the time of the incident complained of, he 
had been a Deputy County Sheriff of Salt Lake County. 
At the actual time of his injury, which was on a Friday 
night, he was on leave of absence and scheduled to return 
to his employment as a deputy sheriff on the following 
Monday. Because he was known in his neighborhood as a 
deputy sheriff, his neighbors had brought to him during 
the summer, complaints about gas being stolen from their 
cars. The Broadheads, who lived across the street, had 
complained to him on several occasions about gas being 
stolen from their truck, which was customarily parked on 
the street. 
On August 30, 1956, he and his seventeen year old son 
returned to their home from a drive-in theatre at about 
11:00 o'clock p. m. After plaintiff got into the house, his 
son came in and told him that someone was trying to steal 
gas from the Broadhead truck, which was parked directly 
across the street from the plaintiff's home. Plaintiff there-
upon got the revolver, which he used as a deputy sheriff, 
and a flash light, and went outside for the purpose of ap-
prehending the culprits (R. 25). Before taking the revolver, 
he made sure it was unloaded (R. 27). He took the revolver 
with him for the psycological reason of apprehending who-
ever was stealing the gas. 
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When he got out onto the street, he saw an automobile 
parked on the north side of the street with one of the young 
defendants by the name of Jeffrey Paul J ongsma sitting 
at the wheel. He, of course, could not identify the defendant 
at that time. He saw the legs of the other defendant, 
Vaughn William Kay, whom he also could not identify at 
that time, over by the truck near the gas tank (R. 28). 
Plaintiff shouted, "Both of you come out where I am." 
When neither answered, he said, "You, under the truck, 
come on out here." The J ongsma boy in the car said, "Tell 
him to go to hell, and if he runs around either end of the 
truck, you run around the other, and take off" (R. 30). 
Neither of the defendants came out as ordered, so the 
plaintiff "stood right there" where he could observe both 
cars. After a few seconds had elapsed, the auto on the north 
side of the street started to move forward slowly (R. 32). 
The lights were off. When the automobile got close to the 
plaintiff, plaintiff turned the flash light on the gun so the 
driver could see it, and said, "Stop, or I will shoot." The 
driver of the car thereupon turned the car directly toward 
him and accelerated it "greatly" (R. 33). The plaintiff 
stood in his position without moving until the car got close, 
at which time, he took one step aside. As he did so, the 
driver's door was thrown open in a forceful manner. The 
plaintiff put his arms out to protect himself. Fortunately, 
because the car window was down, his arms went through 
the open space. When the plaintiff struck the door, it 
caused the door to close, leaving the plaintiff hanging on 
with his arms hanging over the door, holding the flash light 
in one hand and the gun in the other (R: 34). 
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There was no running board on the car, so that plain-
tiff was left hanging helplessly on the side of the door with 
no place for his feet, and his hands holding the flash light 
and gun as indicated. The plaintiff described to the jury 
the way on which he was hanging on the side of the car (R. 
35). In this position, he could not move and kept telling 
the driver to stop. Instead of stopping, the driver told him, 
"To go to hell" (R. 36). 
While plaintiff was hanging helplessly on the side of 
the car, as described, the car continued to move down the 
street toward Holladay. Plaintiff looked for a place to drop 
off, but because there was a car parked on the south side 
of 48th South, he was afraid to let go. By the time the 
escaping car had passed the parked automobile, it was going 
too fast and plaintiff couldn't get off. All during this time 
he kept begging the defendant J ongsma to stop, but instead 
of doing so, J ongsma leaned away from the plaintiff, down 
onto the seat, and while in this "blind" position kept ac-
celerating the car (R. 37). 
As the automobile approached a large power pole, lo-
cated on the south side of the street, plaintiff cried, "For 
God's sake look out for that power pole." The moving auto-
mobile thereupon ran into the power pole and sheared it 
off near the base (R. 38). When the automobile struck the 
pole and sheared it off, it knocked plaintiff flying to the 
ground, where he rolled for several feet. Hot wires from 
the pole fell around him, but fortunately he was not burned. 
The automobile, which had been retarded by striking the 
pole, came to a stop a few feet short of running over the 
plaintiff, who was lying helplessly on the ground. 
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The plaintiff identified on Exhibit "1", the location 
of the power pole, the location of the parked car and the 
position he was in when he finally fell from the side of 
defendants' automobile. 
He testified that when the automobile struck the pole 
it was going at a speed of approximately 40 miles per hour 
(R. 41 to 44). 
When the automobile came to a stop, the defendant 
J ongsma came out the right door and ran up 48th South 
Street. The plaintiff, not realizing how badly he had been 
hurt, took off in pursuit. He was unable to catch the de-
fendant, who disappeared behind some houses (R. 48). 
Plaintiff gave up the chase at his driveway, and told his 
son to call the sheriff's office. The police arrived about 
12 :30 p. m. Prior to the time they arrived, the defendant 
Kay, who had also fled from the scene returned to the area 
where he was identified by the plaintiff's son. 
When the deputy sheriff arrived he apprehended the 
defendant Kay. The defendant Jongsma turned himself in 
the next morning. 
Shortly after the accident occurred, the plaintiff rea-
lized that he had been injured and went to the office of Dr. 
Ronald King in Holladay. At that time he observed that 
he had a very sore left arm, a bad cut and bruise on the 
right buttocks, pain in his groin and pain in his right leg. 
In fact he had stiffened up so much, that he could not walk 
(R. 52). 
When he was examined at the doctor's office, he also 
noted a large bruise in his groin; later his right leg turned 
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black and blue from his hip to the knee; his clothes were 
badly torn. 
The seriousness of the injury resulted from a prior 
condition which had existed and which was badly aggra-
vated by the injury. Prior to the night of the injury, plain-
tiff had had a perforated ulcer. This ulcer had been treated 
and the treatment had been completed (R. 54). 
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff had been in 
excellent health. Shortly after the accident the plaintiff 
began to observe a nauseous feeling in his stomach, ner-
vousness, and an upset condition. He immediately went 
home and remained in bed. He couldn't even sit up. He 
was unable to sleep for two nights and remained in bed 
during the day. Because of the nauseous feeling he was 
unable to eat. 
On the Sunday evening following his injury, after he 
had been in bed for approximately two days, he returned to 
his job at the sheriff's office. When he returned to work, 
he had the same nauseous feeling, and was generally upset. 
However, as it was his first day of work following his leave 
of absence, he felt impelled to return to duty. After he had 
worked a couple of hours, his condition became so bad that 
he had to go to the hospital, where he remained 8 days. 
While in the hospital, he vomited blood several times and 
had to have 5 transfusions. At one time his condition be-
came critical. 
After returning to his home from the hospital, he re-
mained in bed about a week or 10 days (R. 58 to 60). Since 
the accident, he has been very nervous and irritable, and 
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on a bland diet, known as ulcer diet no. 5. Ulcer diet no. 5 
apparently consists of baby food (R. 60). 
The plaintiff described other symptoms he has, which 
were caused by the reperforation of this ulcer, which are 
not important in this appeal. 
The version of the accident given by the two boys dif-
fers from the version given by the plaintiff in several 
respects. They admit that they were stealing gas at the 
time plaintiff came from his home. The defendant Kay was 
unable to relate much about the accident as he was fleeing 
at the time the accident occurred. 
The defendant J ongsma, however, explained to the 
jury that he was 16 years of age, married, and that on the 
night that the injuries occurred he and Vaughn Kay were 
stealing gas from the automobile owned by the Broadheads 
on East 48th South (R. 120). They had a can and a hose, 
which they used in a syphon operation to steal the gas. They 
kept the can and hose in the back seat of their car. 
The plan was that J ongsma would sit behind the driv-
er's seat in the parked car while Kay would steal the gas 
from the truck. While they were engaged in this operation, 
the plaintiff Ferguson came out onto the street. When he 
came out, the defendant Kay was hammering with a ham-
mer on the gas cap, which was locked. He saw the plaintiff 
Ferguson standing in the street about 25 or 30 feet down 
the road. According to J ongsma, when Ferguson came out, 
he stopped in the middle of the road and yelled, "You come 
out of there, you son of a bitch." 
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According to J ongsma's testimony neither he, nor the 
defendant Kay said anything in response to this order. He 
denied that he told the plaintiff Ferguson to go to hell, and 
denied that he told Ferguson, "If he comes around either end 
of the truck to run" (R. 125 to 126). He admits, however, 
that when he saw Ferguson standing in the middle of the 
road, he attempted to escape. When he did so, he claims 
Ferguson said, "Stop, or I will blow your head off." At this 
time he could see both the flash light and the gun. 
He said that it was his intention to drive on past the 
plaintiff. He denied that he drove toward the plaintiff. He 
said, "When the plaintiff said, Stop or I will blow your 
head off,-the plaintiff was standing in the middle of the 
road." He admitted he accelerated his car, but only grad-
ually (R. 129). He had no idea how fast he was going. He 
said as he proceeded past plaintiff, plaintiff grabbed the 
door with his arm, putting his hands around the post of 
the car (R. 130). When the plaintiff grabbed onto the post 
of the car, he said the door swung open. He did not at any 
time attempt to stop, even though he said the plaintiff kept 
saying, "Stop or I will blow your head off." While he had 
his arms around the post, the door came open (R. 131). 
When the door came open, the plaintiff was hanging onto 
the post of the door with both arms. Even though the plain-
tiff was in this position, he did not attempt to slow down 
his car, but in fact continued to accelerate it. 
He was unable to remember how fast he had been go-
ing, but did remember that when he turned himself in the 
next morning, he told the officers he was going forty miles 
per hour. 
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The defendant J ongsma was not corroborated by any-
one. Parts of his testimony are directly in conflict with 
the testimony of the plaintiff, who was corroborated. Fur-
thermore, the defendant Jongsma's testimony conflicts with 
itself. He was first called as an adverse witness by the 
plaintiff. In this testimony he stated, "The door was loose, 
and when he put his arm through the door it came open-
through the window." And again: Q. And when he put 
that arm in that pulled the door open? A. Yes. Q. And 
then he was able to get both arms around the door? A. Yes. 
Q. Which is now open? A. Yes" (R. 133-134). 
Mr. Strong thereafter called the defendant J ongsma as 
his witness. The defendant then testified exactly contrary 
to his first testimony. He was asked: Q. "Now at any time 
after Mr. Ferguson got on this car did the door on which 
he was hanging come open?" A. No ! 
It did appear from the testimony of Jongsma, that 
while he claimed the plaintiff jumped onto the side of the 
car, he admitted that there was no place to hang on-no 
running board, and that the plaintiff had a gun in one 
hand and a flash light in the other (R. 212). 
The significance of the open door is that plaintiff 
claimed the door was thrown open at him and that to pro-
tect himself he threw out his hands and was caught on the 
side of the car when his body knocked the door closed. 
Suit was brought against the Jongsma boy as the driver 
of the automobile. The Kay boy was joined on the theory of 
joint venture and the fathers of each of the boys were joined 
under the motor vehicle act. 
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The case was submitted to the jury on the court's in-
structions and the jury returned a verdict of "no cause of 
action." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY 
THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NO 
DEFENSE TO WILFUL, WANTON OR RECK-
LESS MISCONDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE 
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD 
TO THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND 
RECKLESS CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16, WHICH 
INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF THE 
CASE AND SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF ON THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 17, 
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18, 19 AND 20 WHICH INCORRECTLY AP-
PLIED THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK 
TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND IGNORED 
THE ALLEGED WILFUL AND RECKLESS 
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT JONGSMA 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
CHARGE THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO 
SAID CONDUCT. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTORISTS TO 
DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGH-
WAY. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAIL-
ING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 7, PERTAINING TO THE 
DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CON-
FRONTED WITH SUDDEN AND UNEX-
PECTED PERIL. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT 
KAY WITH REFERENCE TO CONVERSA-
TIONS, WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWING THE APPELLANT'S INJURIES. 
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THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY 
THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NO 
DEFENSE TO WILFUL, WANTON OR RECK-
LESS MISCONDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE 
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD 
TO THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND 
RECKLESS CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
It was the theory of plaintiff's counsel from the outset 
that the conduct of the Jongsma boy exceeded mere negli-
gence and that contributory negligence was therefore no 
defense. The complaint sought punitive damages alleging 
that the conduct involved was "wilful, reckless and wanton" 
(R. 3). The pretrial order clearly set forth the plaintiff's 
position as follows (R. 12) : 
"The plaintiff claims that the defendants may 
not rely on the defense [s] of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk because the acts of the de-
fendant, Jeffrey Paul Jongsma, as complained of, 
constitute a gross negligence and wilful and wanton 
misconduct." 
Plaintiff's evidence, if believed, fully supported the allega-
tions of wilful, wanton and reckless conduct. According to 
plaintiff's version of the case the J ongsma boy drove the 
automobile directly at the plaintiff; threw open the door 
to strike him as plaintiff stepped aside, and then drove the 
automobile down the street at a high rate of speed on the 
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wrong side of the road without heed to the helpless posi-
tion of the plaintiff until the automobile struck a utility 
pole. Although it was not claimed that the J ongsma boy 
did these things with a specific intent to harm the plain-
tiff, it was and is urged that such conduct amounted to a 
reckless disregard for plaintiff's safety. Under these facts 
the plaintiff was entitled to an instruction that contributory 
negligence is not available to one guilty of wilful, reckless 
or wanton conduct. The court not only failed to so instruct 
the jury upon plaintiff's request, but instead expressly 
instructed the jury that plaintiff was not entitled to recover 
if he was found guilty of contributory negligence. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 12 is as follows: 
"You are instructed that it is no defense so far 
as the injuries to l\1:r. Ferguson are concerned that 
he was guilty of negligence contributing to his in-
juries, if the conduct of the defendant Jeffrey 
J ongsma in the operation of the Ford automobile 
amounted to wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness. 
"In this regard if you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant Jeffrey 
J ongsma intentionally turned the automobile he was 
operating in the direction of the plaintiff and drove 
said automobile directly at the plaintiff or that the 
defendant J ongsma intentionally opened the door of 
the car he was operating in an attempt to strike the 
plaintiff with said door and if you further find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct 
on the part of the said J ongsma was a proximate 
cause of the injuries of plaintiff, then you are in-
structed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover re-
gardless of any negligence on his part. 
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"Jensen v. Railroad Company, 44 Utah 100, 138 
Pac. 1185. Restatement of Torts, Section 482." 
The plaintiff was entitled to have his theory of the 
case presented to the jury under proper and applicable in-
structions. Requested Instruction No. 12 was such an in-
struction. It stated in effect that if defendants were guilty 
of such conduct as claimed by plaintiff, contributory negli-
gence was not a defense. That this is a correct statement 
of the law is clear. It is so stated in Vol. 38, Am. Jur., Page 
854, as follows : 
"Section 178.-Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Con-
duct.-There is an abundance of authority for the 
proposition that contributory negligence is not a de-
fense in an action based upon wilful or wanton mis-
conduct or intentional violence. Even in jurisdic-
tions where the doctrine of comparative negligence 
is rejected as a general principle of the common law, 
contributory negligence is no defense to an action 
based on the defendant's reckless, wilful, wanton, or 
intentional misconduct. There is no more reason for 
permitting the defense of contributory negligence in 
a case where the injury was caused by wilful, wan-
ton, or reckless misconduct, than there is for per-
mitting it in a case of assault and battery. No court 
has questioned the soundness of this proposition so 
far as injuries intentionally inflicted are concerned. 
So far as wanton conduct is concerned, some discern-
ment must be exercised by the courts, or the defense 
of contributory negligence will be barred in any 
case merely by the artifice of describing the conduct 
of the defendant as wanton. * * *" 
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The same rule is clearly stated by Cooley, Vol. 2, Cooley 
on Torts, 3rd Ed., Page 1442, as follows : 
"Where the conduct of the defendant is wanton 
and wilful, or where it indicates that degree of in-
difference to the rights of others which may justly 
be characterized as recklessness, the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence has no place whatever, * * *" 
The foregoing statement by Cooley was approved by 
Justice Straup in speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court 
in Jensen v. Railroad Company, 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185. 
A case somewhat analogous to the facts in this case is 
Laconia v. D'Angelo, (N.J. L.), 142 A. 46, 58 A. L. R. 614, 
where the facts were as follows: A trespassing plaintiff 
who was a minor sued the defendant, owner of a vehicle, 
for injuries he sustained when he was knocked off of the 
defendant's automobile. The plaintiff apparently hollered 
at the defendant and said, "Give me a ride." The defendant 
said nothing, so the boy jumped on the side of the car. At 
that the automobile was going very slowly. After he got 
on, the car started to go rapidly and later when he asked 
the driver to stop, he said, "* * * and then I saw a 
hand come around and push me off." The lower court had 
granted a nonsuit on the theory that the plaintiff was a 
trespasser. The upper court, in reversing the lower court, 
said: 
"Now it is perfectly obvious under the testi-
mony that when the car slowed up the boy jumped 
on the running board, that it was thereafter pro-
pelled quite fast, and when he called out to have it 
stopped he was deliberately pushed off by the driver. 
In these circumstances, there can be no other con-
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elusion but that, by reckless indifference to conse-
quences, the driver consciously and intentionally did 
the wrongful act of ejecting the boy from the car, 
where the latter appears to have been a trespasser, 
by deliberately pushing him off." 
The court clearly recognized in the foregoing case that the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff would not bar his 
recovery. 
In the instant case the court apparently recognized that 
there was evidence of misconduct which exceeded simple 
negligence by instructing the jury on the issue of punitive 
damages in Instruction No. 26 and in defining recklessness 
in Instruction No. 27. If the jury had found, as they cer-
tainly could have done under applicable and proper instruc-
tions that defendants or either of them were guilty of mis-
conduct either wilful or wanton or reckless, then contrib-
utory negligence would have no applicability. 
Even though this is clearly the law the court, as herein 
indicated, failed to so instruct and in fact told the jury that 
if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence he 
could not recover. It was so stated in the court's Instruc-
tion No. 16 where defendants' theory as contained in de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 4 was given verbatim. 
In this requested instruction the jury was told that if the 
defendant, Jeffery Paul J ongsma, was negligent plaintiff 
could recover only if the plaintiff himself was not guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
It is thus apparent that the court not only failed to 
instruct on the plaintiff's theory of the case, but instructed, 
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contrary to law, in direct contradiction to said theory. We 
submit that the plaintiff is entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to a jury under correct instructions on the law of the 
case and the theory of the pleadings. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16, WHICH 
INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF THE 
CASE AND SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF ON THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
That part of Instruction No. 16 pertinent to this as-
signment of error reads as follows: 
"Instruction No. 16 
"In this action before you may return a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants 
Jeffrey Paul J ongsma, Jacob J. J ongsma and Vaughn 
William Kay, you must find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that each of the following three prop-
ositions are true: 
["Proposition No. 1 : That defendant J ongsma 
was negligent. Proposition No. 2: That said negli-
gence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, 
and] 
"Proposition No. 3: That the plaintiff himself 
'zcas not guilty of contributory negligence and that 
the plaintiff, by his action and conduct, did not as-
sume the risk of the occurrence as hereinafter de-
fined." 
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This instruction is in all material respects identical to de-
fendants' requested Instruction No. 4 (R. 241). Exception 
to the instruction was taken by counsel for both parties ( R. 
228, 230). By this charge the court instructs the jury in 
plain and simple language that plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover unless they find "from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that * * * the plaintiff himself was not guilty 
of contributory negligence and that the plaintiff, by his 
action and conduct, did not assume the risk * * * ." The 
charge shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to nega-
tive the defendants' allegations of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk. It clearly instructs the jurors that 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless from a preponder-
ance of the evidence they find that plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence and had not assumed the risk. 
In other words under this instruction had the jury found 
the evidence evenly balanced on the issues of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk, the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover. Such an instruction is manifestly erron-
eous for the defendants had the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of the affirmative de-
fenses on which they relied and if the jury found the evi-
dence evenly balanced on these issues the plaintiff was en-
titled to prevail thereon. 
This court has held that an erroneous specific instruc-
tion on the burden of proof constitutes prejudicial error 
and is not cured by a general instruction which when viewed 
with the specific instruction can only serve to confuse and 
mislead the jury. State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 267, 258 P. 
2d 452; See also Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 366, 
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270 Pac. 349; Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, 6 Utah 2d 155, 307 P. 2d 1045; State v. 
Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P. 2d 647. We submit that this error 
is so glaring that no extended argument is necessary to 
demonstrate either the fact of error or its prejudicial na-
ture. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 17, 
18, 19 AND 20 WHICH INCORRECTLY AP-
PLIED THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK 
TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND IGNORED 
THE ALLEGED WILFUL AND RECKLESS 
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT JONGSMA 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
CHARGE THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO 
SAID CONDUCT. 
By instructions Nos. 16 through 20 inclusive, the court 
undertook to define with reference to the facts, exactly what 
would constitute assumed risk on the part of the plaintiff 
which would bar his recovery. 
Instruction No. 16 charged the jury that the plaintiff 
assumed the risk of the defendant J ongsma's negligence if 
he substantially interfered with the vision of the said de-
fendant by flashing a lighted flash light in his face [with-
out regard to whether or not said interference, if any, was 
intentionally caused]. 
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Instruction No. 17 directed the jury that if the plain-
tiff pointed a revolver at Jongsma's head and threatened 
to kill him, such conduct would amount to assumed risk, 
if J ongsma became frightened thereby. 
Instruction No. 18 charged the jury that if the plaintiff 
had an opportunity to move from the path of the vehicle, 
but failed to do so, that such conduct would constitute as-
sumed risk. 
Instruction No. 19 directed the jury that if the plain-
tiff jumped onto the automobile and attempted to hang 
thereon-he was negligent and assumed the risk as a matter 
of law. 
Instruction No. 20 directed the jury that if the plaintiff 
had an opportunity to detach himself from the automobile, 
but failed to do so, then he assumed the risk and was barred 
from recovery. 
Each of these instructions wholly fail to apprise the 
jury of the ultimate facts which they must find in order to 
substantiate the defense of assumed risk, and each of said 
instructions is a bald-faced usurpation of the jury's pre-
rogative in determining the ultimate facts and weighing 
the evidence. 
We submit that the doctrine of assumed risk has no 
application whatsoever to the facts of the instant case, but 
even assuming, arguendo, that such a defense might have 
some application, it is well settled that the jurors are the 
sole judges of the ultimate facts necessary to establish said 
defense. If assumed risk was an appropriate defense, the 
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court's instruction No. 23 properly directed the jury as to 
the facts, which they must find in order to establish the 
defense. Instruction No. 23 was taken from the Jury In-
struction Forms For Utah, and charges the jury that in 
order to find assumed risk they must find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that ( 1) the plaintiff's words or con-
duct clearly indicated that he knew of the danger created 
by the conduct of the defendant and (2) that he voluntarily 
subjected himself thereto and that he consented that if in-
jury resulted, the defendant should be relieved of any lia-
bility therefor. 
It is obvious that the court had no prerogative to in-
struct the jury that the conduct of the plaintiff as set forth 
in the instructions 16 through 20, constituted assumed risk 
as a matter of law, without regard to the motives or intent 
of the plaintiff and the various possible explanations for 
his conduct. As a practical matter, we submit that said 
instructions under the circumstances amounted to a directed 
verdict for the defendants. 
For example, it was clear from the evidence that the 
plaintiff got onto the automobile and failed to detach him-
self before the collision; that he had a revolver and a lighted 
flash light in his hand, and that some threat had been made. 
Can the jury be properly instructed as a matter of law to 
determine from these facts that the plaintiff voluntarily 
assumed the risk of defendant's reckless and wanton con-
duct? 
The error in these instructions consists not only in 
improperly defining what is an assumption of risk, but 
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also in improperly making applicable the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk to a person engaged in the arrest of crim-
inals. 
We believe that the doctrine of assumption of risk is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case. If the plaintiff had 
a right to arrest or apprehend the defendants as the court 
instructed the jurors in Instruction No. 13, then any risk 
he might have undertaken in accomplishing what he had a 
right to do would not be a defense to the defendants. The 
rule is stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol-
ume 1, Page 245, as follows: 
"The use of force against another for the pur-
pose of effecting his arrest and the arrest thereby 
effected are privileged if all the conditions stated 
in §§ 119 to 132, in so far as they are applicable, 
exist." 
Under "b." of the Comment at Page 248, the following 
is stated: 
"* * * Where a privilege to arrest exists, 
it justifies not only the confinement but also any 
conduct which is reasonably necessary to effect the 
arrest." 
From the foregoing it is clear that if the plaintiff had 
a right to arrest and apprehend the defendants he was justi-
fied in doing anything which was reasonably necessary to 
effect that end. Therefore, instructing the jury as the court 
did, misled the jurors into believing that if the plaintiff 
assumed the risk, which of course in one sense he did when 
he attempted to apprehend the defendants, he could not 
recover. We submit that this is not, and should not be the 
law. It is one thing to talk of assumption of risk in guest 
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cases under the Utah Guest Statute, and quite another to 
preclude one who has a right to assume the risk of making 
an arrest from recovery because he exercises his right. 
If the court's instructions are correct on assumption of 
risk, then one who has a right to apprehend or arrest can-
not recover against an escaping defendant for any injur-
ies incurred if the act or acts of apprehension were risky. 
We submit that making an arrest or apprehending crimin-
als is by its very nature risky. 
The plaintiff in the case now before this court was 
placed in a dilemma by the court's instructions. He had a 
right to apprehend and arrest the defendants, but if he 
exercised his right by failing to get out of their way, or if 
he jumped on their car to accomplish his purpose he as-
sumed the risk, and could not recover. We submit that this 
is not the law. 
The instructions on assumption of risk were not only 
inapplicable to the facts of the case at bar and erroneous 
in their application of the law to the said facts, but wholly 
failed to account for the effect of the wilful, reckless and 
wanton misconduct of the defendant J ongsma. 
The plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 11, reads as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that it is no defense so far 
as the injuries to Mr. Ferguson are concerned that 
he voluntarily assumed the risk of injury, if the 
conduct of the defendant Jeffery Jongsma in the 
operation of the Ford automobile amounted to wil-
fulness and wantonness." 
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"In this regard if you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant Jeffery 
J ongsma intentionally turned the automobile he was 
operating in the direction of the plaintiff and drove 
said automobile directly at the plaintiff or that the 
defendant J ongsma intentionally opened the door of 
the car he was operating in an attempt to strike the 
plaintiff with said door and if you further find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct 
on the part of the said J ongsma was wilful and 
wanton and was a proximate cause of the injuries of 
plaintiff, then you are instructed that the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover regardless of any assumption 
of risk on his part." 
In Restatement of the Law of Torts, Valume 2, Page 
1262, Section 482, the following is stated under "Comment:" 
"a. If the defendant's conduct amounts to 
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety as those 
words are defined in § 500, the plaintiff is not 
barred from recovery by any form of contributory 
negligence. He is not barred from recovery by his 
failure to exercise reasonable vigilance, although 
had he done so he would have discovered the defen-
dant's reckless misconduct in time to have avoided 
harm therefrom. He is not barred from recovery by 
a failure to exercise reasonable care and competence 
after he knows of the defendant's reckless miscon-
duct and realizes the dangers involved herein. The 
plaintiff is not barred even by tha.t form of negli-
gence which is called voluntary assumption of risk. 
In order that the plaintiff's conduct may bar him 
from recovery, it is necessary that he not only know 
of the defendant's reckless conduct but also realize 
the gravity of the risk involved therein so that he 
is not only unreasonable but reckless in exposing 
himself to it." 
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The Restatement in effect states that unless the con-
duct of the plaintiff is itself reckless even though it comes 
under the heading of assumption of risk, it will not bar 
recovery. 
In the instant case the court in giving some of defen-
dants' requests actually instructed the jurors that if the 
"plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care 
had an opportunity to move from the path of the vehicle 
* * * but failed to do so * * * then he assumed 
the risk" (Instruction No. 18) . In Instruction No. 20 the 
jurors were told that if plaintiff "had an opportunity in 
the exercise of reasonable care to detach himself" from 
the car but failed to do so then he assumed the risk. 
We submit that a verdict cannot be allowed to stand 
under such obviously erroneous and prejudicial instructions. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTORISTS TO 
DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGH-
WAY. 
The plaintiff's complaint alleged several acts of negli-
gence and recklessness as grounds for recovery. These were 
set out clearly in the pretrial order. One of the acts com-
plained of was that J ongsma drove the automobile on the 
wrong side of the road. As a matter of fact, this was the 
very act which caused the collision with the telephone pole 
resulting in plaintiff's injuries. By his requested Instruc-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
tion No. 8, the plaintiff requested the court to instruct the 
jury as follows: 
"Instruction No. 8. You are instructed that the 
laws of the State of Utah require that upon all road-
ways of sufficient width motor vehicles shall be 
driven upon the right half of the roadway with cer-
tain exceptions not pertinent to the case before you. 
In this regard if you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant Jeffery J ongsma 
drove the Ford automobile on the left half of 4800 
South Street and that his conduct in this regard was 
negligence, and if you further find from a prepon-
derance of the evidence that such negligence was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, then I 
instruct you to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff 
and assess damages in accordance with these in-
structions unless you find that plaintiff is barred 
from recovery by his own conduct. 41-6-53, U. C. A., 
1953." 
The court refused to give this instruction either in 
whole or in substance. The court's refusal to so instruct 
deprived the plaintiff from getting his complete theory of 
the case to the jury. There is certainly no question but 
what the instruction correctly states the law and from the 
evidence there can be no doubt that J ongsma actually did 
drive the automobile on the wrong side of the roadway. 
The only hint in the instructions that J ongsma might 
be found negligent in driving his automobile on the wrong 
side of the road was contained in the court's Instruction No. 
16 given at the request of the defendants. The pertinent 
portion of this instruction required the jury to find that 
Jongsma "knowingly" drove the automobile on the wrong 
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side of the road. This instruction not only failed to put the 
plaintiff's theory to the jury but stated an incorrect propo-
sition of law with regard thereto. It is elementary that in 
order to constitute negligence it is not necessary that an act 
be committed knowingly. If the defendant either knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that 
the automobile which he was operating was being driven on 
the wrong side of the road, he was guilty of negligence. 
If properly instructed, the jury might well have found 
under the circumstances of this case that the operation by 
Jongsma of the Ford automobile on the wrong side of the 
road was negligence and that this negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This being true, it 
seems inescapable that the failure of the court to instruct 
the jury in this regard constituted prejudicial error. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAIL-
ING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 7, PERTAINING TO THE 
DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CON-
FRONTED WITH SUDDEN AND UNEX-
PECTED PERIL. 
Under the plaintiff's testimony Jongsma suddenly 
turned the Ford automobile in the direction of the plaintiff 
and drove the same directly at him. Counsel for defendant 
attempted to make much of the fact that the plaintiff did 
not run out of the path of the vehicle as soon as it was 
turned in his direction, contending that Ferguson had a 
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duty to get out of the path of the automobile and failing 
was negligent. Even assuming that such a duty existed, 
which we deny, the duty should have been considered in 
the light of all the circumstances. Mr. Ferguson frankly 
stated that had he run to the side of the road as soon as the 
automobile was turned in his direction he could probably 
have placed himself out of danger. Being placed in a posi-
tion of sudden and unexpected peril, however, the law does 
not require that he exercise· the same judgment and pru-
dence in that situation that may be required of him in more 
calm and deliberate moments. In order to insure that the 
jury properly understood the law applicable to this situa-
tion, the plaintiff requested the following instruction : 
"Instruction No. 7. A person who, without neg-
ligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly 
confronted with peril arising from either the actual 
presence or the appearance of eminent danger to 
himself or to others is not expected nor required to 
use the same judgment and prudence that may be 
required of him in calmer and more deliberate mom-
ents." 
"In such a situation, his duty is to exercise only 
the degree of care which an ordinary prudent per-
son would exercise under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. If at that moment he exercises such 
care he does all the law requires of him, even though 
in the light of after events it may appear that a dif-
ferent choice and manner of action would have been 
better and safer. If, in this case, you find that the 
plaintiff was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted 
with such a situation and the action which they took 
to avoid the accident was such as an ordinary pru-
dent person would have exercised under the same 
or similar circumstances then he was not guilty of 
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negligence in so acting although it might appear 
that a different choice or manner of action would 
have been better and safer." 
The court refused to give the instruction in whole or 
in substance. 
This instruction is taken verbatim from the Uniform 
Jury Instructions of this State (JIFU No. 15.4). It prop-
erly states the law and has direct application to the facts 
of the instant case. It is likely that the jury concluded 
from the evidence and the court's instructions that the 
plaintiff either assumed the risk or was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. The court's refusal to fully instruct the 
jury with regard to the law pertaining to contributory neg-
ligence and particularly the duty of a person suddenly and 
unexpectedly confronted with peril constituted prejudicial 
error. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT 
KAY WITH REFERENCE TO CONVERSA-
TIONS, WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWING THE APPELLANT'S INJURIES. 
Plaintiff called Kay as an adverse witness. Both he 
and the defendant J ongsma had testified that on the night 
in question they were frightened and that their acts were 
motivated by fear. The plaintiff desired to ask the witness 
Kay if he had not, in conversations immediately after the 
accident, made statements which indicated that the moti-
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vating force was not fear. In the absence of the jury, the 
plaintiff made a proffer of this testimony from the wit-
nesses Mrs. Broadhead, the Plaintiff Ferguson, and from 
his wife. These people testified that immediately after the 
accident the Defendant Kay returned to the scene and when 
threatened with a complaint by the Broadheads stated, 
"That if a complaint were filed, he and his gang would 
wipe the Broadheads out" (R. 194). 
Mrs. Ferguson testified that she had a conversation 
with the defendant Kay immediately after the accident, 
while he was sitting in the sheriff's car with one of the 
deputies and at that time asked if he were the one that 
caused "this mess", and he answered, "Yes, I am. What 
are you going to do about it, God damn you?" 
It is counsel's position that these conversations were 
admissible, at least on the issue of credibility. 
Kay had testified that he was frightened and "as scared 
as a man could be" and that what he did was actuated by 
fear. We submit that the court erred in restricting the cross 
examination of Kay on this matter. This was a critical 
matter for the evidence on either side was in many signifi-
cant particulars in direct conflict and the credibility of the 
witnesses was of considerable importance to the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that the plaintiff is entitled to have his 
case submitted to a jury under instructions presenting his 
theory of the case and correctly setting forth the law with 
regard to contributory negligence, assumption of risk and 
the burden of proof. The cause should be reversed with in-
structions to grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
For VanCott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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